

Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
 EVENING CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATHE
 FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)
 Weather message from Tokyo station JW3 transmitted at approximately
 2130 GMT December 8, 1941.

Document No. 4

English

Romaji

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
 NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT
 THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE
 WEATHER FORECAST:

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOKAI-
 MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI
 KOKO DE TENKI YOTO WO MOSHI-
 AGE MASU

WEST WIND, CLEAR
 WEST WIND, CLEAR

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
 NISHI NO KAZE HARE

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
 NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT
 SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE
 WEATHER FORECAST:

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOKAI-
 MARU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU
 NI TENKI YOTO WO MOSHIAGE
 MASU

WEST WIND, CLEAR
 WEST WIND, CLEAR

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
 NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations J104 and J13 transmitted by them between 0002 GMT December 8, 1941.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 13

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A—Messages relating to Japanese interest in ships	1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24
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TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
 Washington 25, D. C., 14 May 1945.

Op-20-4-mp
 Serial 0002020
 (SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.

Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are photostatic copies of the following dispatches, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

JD-1: 1842
 JD-1: 5696
 JD-1: 5730
 JD-1: 6850
 JD-1: 6943
 JD-1: 6985
 JD-1: 7029
 JD-1: 7122

JD-1: 7063
 JD-1: 7111
 JD-1: 7148
 JD-1: 7157
 JD-1: 7158
 JD-1: 7178
 JD-1: 7179
 JD-1: 7212

JD-1: 7214
 JD-1: 7280
 JD-1: 7294
 JD-1: 7360
 JD-1: 7335
 JD-1: 7370
 JD-1: 7511
 JD-1: 8007

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

From: Honolulu (Okuda).
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).
10 March, 1941.
(J18K8)*
#043

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:
Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania class).

Five heavy cruisers (two of the ----- class, one of the ----- class, and two of the ----- class).

Six light cruisers (four of the ----- class and two of the Omaha class).
Yorktown.

25 destroyers (-----)

Two destroyer tenders.

Several submarines.

One submarine tender.

Several transports.

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.

*Note: This is first translation of J18K8, a new system effective 1 March, 1941.

JD-1: 1842 Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Honolulu.
September 24, 1941.
J-19.
#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

JD-1: 5696

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Washington.
29 September 1941.
Circular #041.

Honolulu to Tokyo #178.

Re your #083.*

(Strictly secret.)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): K'T.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

JD-1: 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)

*Not available.

**Available, dated 21 August.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 19 November 1941.
 (J19).
 Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."
 - (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
 - (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."
- The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
 Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
 JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #985. (Part 1 of 3.)^a

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments separately.)

In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25552 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)

^a Part 2 not available.
^b Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #985. (Part 3 of 3.)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitudes toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one following.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25553 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (MR)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
27 November 1941.
(J19)

Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete).

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324.

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message).

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

Code Word	Meaning
ARIMURA-----	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI-----	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA-----	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA-----	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA-----	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI-----	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA-----	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)-----	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA-----	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have been severed.
HATTORI-----	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not in accordance with expectation.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA-----	Japan's and . . . (blank's) . . . military forces have clashed.
HOSINO-----	Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI-----	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAKAKI-----	Have you --? - the . . . (blank) . . . matter?
ISHIKAWA-----	I have--? the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI-----	We are commencing <i>military action</i> ? against . . . (blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA-----	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA-----	Japan.
KOMIYAMA-----	China.
KOYANAGI-----	England.
KUBOTA-----	U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA-----	France (?).
KUSUNOKI-----	Germany.
MATUTANI-----	Italy.

(Part 4)

MINAMI-----	U. S. A.
MIWATA-----	Canada.
MIYAZAKI-----	Mexico.
MOROKOSI-----	Brazil.
MOTIZUKI-----	Panama.
NAGAMINE-----	Argentina.
NAKAZATO-----	Thailand.
NANGO-----	French Indo-China.
NEGI (?)-----	Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA-----	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO-----	Malaya.
OKUMZRA-----	Australia.
ONIZUKA-----	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODERA-----	Enemy country.
OTANI-----	? (Possibly : friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI-----	Year.
SIMANAKA-----	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA-----	Tsuki) Month.
SIGENOI-----	(KŌ) Paragraph.
SANZYŌ-----	(Toki) Time.
ITIRŌ-----	1.
NISAKU-----	2.
SANTARŌ-----	3.
YOITI-----	4.
GORŌ-----	5.
MASAROKU-----	6.
SIMETARŌ-----	7.
YASOKITI-----	8.
HISAMATU-----	9.
ATUMI-----	0.

JD-1: 6985 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 20, 1941.

#111. Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).

To: Santiago.

2 December 1941.

(J19.)

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete).

Tokyo to Rio as Circular No. 2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular No. 2409*.

The following are added this date to my Circular No. 2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's note: Undellned values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

Code Word	Meaning
ASAHINA-----	From - - (blank) - - (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.
DATE-----	Please telegraph probable amount of - - (blank) - - that can be imported.
KAWAHARA-----	I estimate we can probably import about - - (blank) tons of - - (blank) - -.

*JD-1: 6985. List of code names to be used in plain language messages. with indicator STOP at end.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
NIWAGUCHI----- (Kawaguchi)	It is impossible to carry out - - blank) - -
NAKAMUTA----- (Nakamura)	Are in the process of arranging for importation of - - (blank) - - (country).
SATUNAKATA----- (Munakata)	Send communications via - - (blank) - - (country).
KAZAMA-----	Communications will be through office stationed in - - (blank) - - (country).
TOKUSIMA-----	Japanese ship should arrive in - - (blank) - - (country) on - - (blank) - - (month) - - (blank) - - (day).
TAKENOUTI-----	Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to - -(blank)- - (country)?
YA-GI----- (Yanagi)	It is not possible to send Japanese ships to - - (blank) - - (country).
TONEGI-----	It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to - -(blank)- - (country).

(Part 2)

TAKAGI-----	Minerals.
SAWAMURA-----	Lead.
-SUMI-----	Mercury.
(Kasumi)	
IWASAKI-----	Petroleum.
HIROHATA-----	Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI-----	Platinum.
KADA-----	Copper.
NAKAGAWA-----	Carat.
MAEHATA-----	Peru.
MASUKO-----	Chile.
SENEDA-----	Colombia.
TAKENAKA-----	Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
SIMAZU-----	Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
IMAZAWA-----	Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE-----	San QINY.**
HASIMOTO-----	Cuba.

SINDŌ-----	Havana.
TIBA-----	Rio de Janeiro.
TOZAWA-----	Sao Paulo.

(Part 3)

HASEGAWA-----	Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE-----	Santos.
ENOMOTO-----	BAURŪ.
BEPPU-----	Curityba.
TIKAMATU-----	Belem.
SUETUGU-----	Buenos Aires.
OKIZUMI-----	Santiago.
YAMATO-----	Lima.
UMEGAWA-----	Bogota.
HARA-----	Caracas.
ISONO-----	Montevideo (?).
FUKAMATI-----	Asuncion.

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo, Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

**Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).

***Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago".

JD-1: 7122 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "H", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^a and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

JD-1: 7063 ARMY 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (3)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

From Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "XB". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.^d

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relay to —

JD-1: 7111. Middle Loch. SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in WE code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.

To: (Circular telegram).

7 December 1941.

(Plain Japanese language using code names).

Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To Honolulu

November 28, 1941

J19 (Priority)

#118.

Re your #232^a.

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

JD-1: 7157 ARMY 25859 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (5)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25432 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 28, 1941.

#119 Re your message #243^a.

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

^a Available in code under study.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#253 Re the last part of your #123^a.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Fort and Ewa^b, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 JD 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

^a Not available.

^b Kana spelling.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

Nine battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

#238.

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12;

interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12/8/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Singapore.

December 2, 1941.

J19-19.

Circular #2450.

(5 yards complete.)

Re my Circular #2409^a.

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KIKUTI-----	Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA-----	Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually stopped.
(DE ?)OUTI-----	---(blank)---(blank)--- has been forced backward at ---(blank)---
AYAOKA-----	The Bumese Independents movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this with every resource, however, the movement is gradually growing more fierce.
ITAOISI-----	On the --- the Burma ---(blank)--- was attacked by the Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI-----	On the ---th in the ---(blank)--- area rioting broke out.
MIYAMOTO-----	I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.
<i>PART II</i>	
KITAMURA-----	Recently ---(blank)--- American military planes arrived at ---(blank)---
MUTO-----	---(blank)--- and pilots numbering ---(blank)--- arrived at ---(blank)---
NAGAOKA-----	---(blank)--- divisions of ---(blank)--- troops arrived at ---(blank)--- and left for ---(blank)--- on the ---th.
INABA-----	---(blank)--- divisions of ---(blank)--- troops are reportedly concentrated on the ---(blank)--- border.
YASIROEW-----	The Independents movement at ---(blank)--- and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA-----	At present there is a total of ---(blank)--- enemy merchant men docked at ---(blank)---
NINO-----	Merchant ships now docked at ---(blank)--- are as follows: American ---(blank)---; British ---(blank)---; Netherlands ---(blank)---
NAGAY-----	---an merchant ships left for ---(blank)--- loaded with arms.
NIOGUTI-----	Our means of communication with Burma and the South Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.
SEGAWA-----	Our resident Nationals have been camped.
<i>PART III</i>	
YASUI-----	It is reported that riots are breaking out.
MARUSE-----	Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.
KUBOTA-----	Oil fields bombed.
NIRA-----	The residents of --- area are preparing to flee.
MOORI-----	Orders issued to residents of ---(blank)--- area to flee.
SEKYA-----	Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO-----	Netherlanders.
OCHIAI-----	Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBAPA-----	Japanese.
SISIYAMA-----	---
YAMANOUTI-----	Premier.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
NOSE-----	Specialists' Commission.
KURODA-----	High tide (?).
NIRAI-----	Some officers and private citizens -----
INOYAMA-----	Telegraphy.
ENDOO-----	The Yamashita Agency.
ATUKAX-----	The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI-----	India.
AER-----	Java.
EDOGUTI-----	Sumatra.
HIROSE-----	Celebes.
HUKUI-----	Borneo.
INOCYE-----	-----
FUKA-----	British India.
KASAURA-----	Ceylon.
IKAWA-----	-----
<i>PART IV</i>	
HUJIMURA-----	Hainan Island.
IJJIMA-----	The Spratleys.
ARIASA-----	Singapore.
HORUTA-----	Pinan.
NIWA-----	Bangkok.
KAMIYA-----	Chien mai* ---- Singora.
ISIDA-----	Saigon.
NINOMIYA-----	-----
HOSOKAWA-----	-----
NEZU-----	Tonkin.
YOKOTA-----	Cambodia.
NUMATA-----	-----
WATAMZAWA-----	Manila.
NOKAKI-----	-----
KERI-----	Batavia.
SEKINE-----	Menado.
SERISAWA-----	Makassar.
SOWE-----	-----
ANDO-----	Pankaran-Brandau*.
DOBASI-----	Pankau Sasu*.
FUKUSIMA-----	Mandalay.
BAKAMATSU-----	Palembang.
<i>PART V</i>	
ISTUMOTO-----	Jambi.
NAKINO-----	Tarakan.
MAKINO-----	Pa--- Pan.
SAKURAI-----	Sagsirinda*.
TAKANO-----	Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA-----	Paura*.
YANAGIYA-----	Banka*.
WATAGI-----	Birlton*.
FOAWA-----	Sunda*.
AIDA-----	Malacca.
BANDO-----	Sumaran*.
FUNARASI-----	Timor.
IKEDA-----	New Guinea.
KATAGIRI-----	Lashie.
MIXOGUYI-----	The Periswisa* region.
NICKADA-----	The Geta* region.
SAWAKARA-----	The Keta Eharu Region.
TAKESITA-----	East.
UTSUMONIYA-----	West.
YAMASE-----	South.
ARAWAKI-----	North.
DOOKY-----	Island.

JD-1: 7214 ARMY 25943 SECRET Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

* See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

*Kena spelling.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 5 December 1941.
 #252.

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.

3 light cruisers.

16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and * * * were in dock.

26029.

JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*Available, dated 29 November.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119.*

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns can not be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on 50 percent of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

(2) The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

* JD-1: 7158.

**Available, dated 23 November.

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).
 To: Santiago.
 2 December 1941.
 (J19).

Circular #328.

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November.

Re my Circular #2409*

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning.</i>
KASIMA-----	Have Japanese living there been interned?
KANŌ-----	Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI-----	Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO-----	Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO-----	The wave length of General Information broadcast will be changed to-----kilocycles from----- (day)----- (month)-----
KAKAO-----	Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please change wave length.
(Kayao)-----	
TUJIKITA-----	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present wave length.
TABUSE-----	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a longer wave length.
(Tabuti)-----	
SAITŌ-----	The time of General Information broadcast is to be changed starting on----- (day)----- from----- (time)----- to----- (time)-----
HAYASAKI-----	Please change time of General Information broadcast, starting on----- (day)----- to, from----- (time)----- to----- (time)-----
ISEZAKI-----	100 (hyaku)
WANAMI-----	1,000 (sen)
YASUNO-----	10,000 (man)
UNO-----	100,000 (jyu man)
ITIOTA-----	1,000,000 (hyaku man)
(perhaps ITIOKA)	
(probably UTIOKA)	

JD-1: 7360 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6985. List of code words similar to above.

From: Tientsin (7) *Peking*

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

(Purple).

#625. (Circular Number.)

To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

JD-1: 7335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)

*Not available.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941.
 #245 (In 2 parts, complete).

(Military secret.)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:
1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie.....	1
A number of carriers.....	Preparing to sortie.....	2
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 1st and 3d.....	3
Carriers.....	Several departed between 1st and 3d.....	4
Carriers.....	All departed between 1st and 3d.....	5
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	6
Carriers.....	Several departed between 4th and 6th.....	7
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	8

26145.

JD-1: 7370 (continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

2. Signals.

- I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....	1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m.....	2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m.....	3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m.....	4

II.—

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m.....	5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m.....	6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.....	7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m.....	8

(Part 2.)

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.

- If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

- IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

Times	Signal
1900-2000.....	3
2000-2100.....	4
2100-2200.....	5
2200-2300.....	6
2300-2400.....	7
0000-0100.....	8

V. K. G. M. G. *** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC—CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south-

*Between Waimanala and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received.

Time	Signal
From 7-8-----	3 or 6
From 8-9-----	4 or 7
From 9-10-----	5 or 8

JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part 0 of 2)

Re your #114.^a

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

JD-7511.

^a Not available.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part 2 of 2.)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in group sf -----, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)

JD-7511.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

J-19.

#123. (Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications

that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

JD-1: 8007 ARMY 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/29/41 (5)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 14

(Exhibit No. 14 originally consisted of four parts: Exhibits 14A, 14B, 14C, and 14D, being photostatic copies of a Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and locations of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. These photostatic copies are reproduced as a single chart and will be found as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 15

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
25 July 1941.
(Purple).
#547.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleet, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy.

JD-1: 4663 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nagura).
To: Tokyo.
October 14, 1941.
Purple.

#543 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code).

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could not abide most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

* For part 2 see S. L. S. # 25316.